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ABSTRACT 
Whether using market mechanisms to allocate green certificates in various countries is an 
optimal  solution  for  stimulating  green  electricity  production  represents  a  question 
proposed by numerous recent comparative analyses, with opinions being split. Our paper 
proposes a differing perspective, employing modern computational economics techniques 
in order to study if general equilibrium is achievable, nationally and internationally, and 
how  it  compares  with  the  non-market  steady  state.  We  analyse  the  field,  determining 
exogenous and endogenous factors of influence that we cast into functional relationships 
via econometric estimation. Subsequently, we study four multi-period general equilibrium 
models, recursive and non-recursive, solving the latter ones via a Johansen/Euler method 
for simultaneous all-year computation. General equilibrium is shown to be achievable but 
dependent on country specific conditions, with optimality being relative in a globalised 
context. In closing, we present a case study focused on providing useful guidelines for 
future international marketing efforts in this domain.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Diminishing and ultimately eliminating the damaging impact traditional industrial activity 
has upon the surrounding environment has been at the centre of numerous debates and 
investigations for the past decades. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the energetic sector has been 
identified as one of the primary areas in which intervention would generate a significant 
effect. One of the more prominent initiatives is the one put forth by the Commission of the 
European Union in its White Paper on Renewable Energy (European Commission, 1999). 
Out  of  the  numerous  mechanisms  that  have  been  designed  along  the  way,  from  strict 
governmental  coercion  to  use  of  incentives  to  stimulate  the  move  to  environmentally 
friendly technologies, the relatively recently introduced “green certificates” show a notable 
amount  of  promise  in  terms  of  stimulating the  penetration  of  green  electricity  into  the 
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electricity market. This is in no small part due to their potential to be allocated via pure 
market mechanisms, rather than arbitrarily by one authority or another. In brief, electricity 
producers create green certificates as they produce electricity employing renewable energy 
sources. Demand can be generated by different actors, from consumers to the government 
itself (either indirectly, through coercion, or directly, through purchase). Considering that 
the  electricity  supply  chain  is  composed  of  3  categories  of  actors,  namely  generators, 
distributors and suppliers, Table 1 synthesizes potential distortions (Schaeffer et al., 1999). 
It‟s worth noting that in spite of the promise, some economists are sceptical in their regard, 
a notable example being Haugneland (2004). 
Some amount of formal research has been invested in the design and study of a market for 
green  certificates,  especially  since  countries  in  northern  Europe  have  moved  towards 
implementing one. We‟ll note work presented in Morthorst (2000; 2003), Jensen and Skytte 
(2002),  Soderholm  (2008)  or  Marchenko  (2008).  The latter  is  somewhat related to  our 
work,  as  it  seeks  to  study  the  equilibrium  for  a  green  certificate  market  using  a 
mathematical model, arriving at the conclusion that green certificates represent suboptimal 
means for minimizing the impact of energy production on the environment, whilst also 
outlining that a mix between traditional and green sources is the likeliest to generate an 
economy wide optimum. 
 
Table 1. Market distortions per level of obligation 
 
Level of 
obligation 
Green Certificate system introduced 
at national level only 
Green Certificate system 
introduced European-wide with 
varying degrees of liberalisation 
Generator 
International competitive 
disadvantages because other 
countries have no target obligation. 
International comparative 
disadvantage because of varying 
degrees of liberalisation. 
Supply 
Possibility of consumers to by-pass 
the obligated level. 
 
International competitive 
disadvantages because other 
countries have no target obligation. 
Possibility of consumers to by-
pass the obligated level. 
 
International comparative 
disadvantage because of varying 
degrees of liberalisation. 
Consumer   
(International comparative 
disadvantage because of varying 
degrees of liberalisation). 
Source: adapted from Schaeffer et al. (1999), p. 11 
 
We approach the problem from a different angle: we treat it as a Computable General 
Equilibrium (henceforth CGE) one, and we also account for international effects, rather 
than focusing on the energy sector from a single country in isolation. This juxtaposition 
allows us to study not only intra-country but also inter-country regional aspects, as well as 
evaluate the dynamic behaviour of the model we propose. Moreover, using a CGE model 
allows us to leverage modern computing techniques in order to rapidly evaluate a high 
number of simulation steps, in the case of multi-period forecasting, as well as use more 
complex functional forms. 
In our analysis, we chose to study two somewhat dichotomous market contexts, namely the 
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and,  respectively,  the  emerging  Romanian  market.  Beyond  common  aspects,  like 
production volumes and pricing at equilibrium, we were also interested in evaluating more 
subtle aspects, like the impact of different consumer cultures on consumer reactions to 
policy changes. 
 
1. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
We will briefly discuss the structure of a CGE model, as well as the Johansen/Euler method 
we use for solving it. The interested reader is directed to the extensive treatment present by 
Dixon and Parmenter (1996). We reuse notational conventions employed there. 
A CGE model can be used both for single period comparative static analyses as well as for 
multi-period forecasting. It is fully described by the following 6-tuple: 
  Input-output data; 
  Elasticity parameters; 
  Theoretical specification; 
  Solution algorithm; 
  Result interpretation. 
We now turn to presenting the algorithm proposed in Johansen (1960). Let 
n V    be the 
vector that describes the equilibrium state of the model, or, otherwise said, it is a solution 
for: 
 
n n : F 0, V F        (1) 
F is assumed to be differentiable, and n > m, therefore n – m variables are exogenous by 
rapport with the model. Let V
1 be a known initial solution satisfying (1). We can rewrite  
(1) as: 
0 ) , ( 2 1  V V F    (2) 
where
m V   1 is  the  vector  of  endogenous  variables  and
n m V
   2 is  the  vector  of 
exogenous variables. By totally differentiating (2) and imposing the condition of remaining 
at an equilibrium we arrive at: 
0 ) ( ) ( 2
1
2 1
1
1   dV V F dV V F    (3) 
where F1 and F2 are matrices of F‟s partial derivatives evaluated at V
I. In this context, a 
single step Johansen/Euler approximation becomes: 
2
1
1 ) ( dV V B dV     (4) 
where 
) ( ) ( ) (
1
2
1 1
1
1 V F V F V B
       (5) 
If B(V
I) can be evaluated, we have thus obtained insight how endogenous variables are 
affected by movements in exogenous variables, around the equilibrium state. Whilst there 
are a number of aspects of the algorithm that are more than worth an in-depth discussion, 
given the spatial constraints we will contend with fleshing out the magnitude and impact of 
approximation errors. 
Let us consider that B(V
I) contains the partial derivatives of the endogenous variables V1 
with  respect  to  the  exogenous  variables  V2,  evaluated  at  V
I.  Otherwise  said,  it  is  the 
Jacobian matrix of a solution function G. By way of consequence, evaluating dV1 through 
(4) only provides a first order approximation of the impact on the endogenous variables. Let 
(dV1)true be the exact vector of coefficients assumed by the model and (dV1)1 the result of 
(4). Then, we have: Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 2, 2011 
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) ( ) ( ) (
1
2 2
1
2 1 V G dV V G dV true    HOT dV V B   2
1) ( HOT dV   1 1) (    (6) 
with HOT being the vector of higher order terms in the Taylor series expansion around V
I. 
The magnitude of the approximation error clearly depends on the magnitude of dV2, and the 
way to ensure that the former is as close as possible to the true values is to use a multi-step 
computation. For example, using a two-step computation, in the first iteration we compute: 
)
2
1
( ) ( 2 2 , 1 2 , 1 1 dV B dV     (7) 
where (dV1)1,2 represents the approximation for the impact of introducing a half-shock into 
the exogenous variables and  B1,2=B(V
1) as defined in (5). We use the result of the first step 
computation to re-evaluate B: 
 

 
    ) (
2
1
) ( 2
1
2 2 , 1 1
1
1 2 , 1 dV V dV V V   (8) 
) ( ) ( 2 , 1 2 2 , 1
1
1 2 , 2 V F V F B
      (9) 
thus becoming able to compute: 





  2 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 2
1
) ( dV B dV    (10) 
which represents the effect of the remaining half of the exogenous variable shocks. From 
(7) and (10) we can compute the two-step approximation:  
2 , 2 1 2 , 1 1 2 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( dV dV dV      (11) 
Conveniently,  two  step  approximations  tend  to  suffice  when  dealing  with  quadratic 
functions, which fit our use case well. However, for non-quadratic forms more steps are 
required – for a more extensive discussion of such aspects we point the interested reader to 
texts like Dahlquist et al. (1974) or Dixon et al. (1982). The main relevant insight is that the 
structure and solution algorithm we have chosen for our model is capable of providing 
adequate steady state solutions, when properly tuned. 
In our model, we rely on data provided by relevant authorities for the input-output database. 
We  split  the  energy  sector  into  3  types  of  domestic  producers,  2  types  of  investors,  a 
representative consumer and an aggregate foreign attractor of certificates. The industries 
are considered to be profit maximizers, with green certificates having a positive net effect 
on the value of the profit function   


 





0
green

 . In their role as users of resources, they 
are price takers (none of the industries can dictate the price of primary factors, namely 
labour and capital).  
We assume a CES production function and vary the parameter to particularise per each 
producer type, with constant returns to scale being considered: 
j j
p
i
p
ij ij j j X b A Z
1


 


 


   with  
i
i b 1 
The  representative  consumer  maximises  a  nested  utility  function  subject  to  aggregate-
expenditure constraint, with the top-level utility function being of the Klein-Rubin type: 


 
n
i
i i i q b U
1
) ln(   with  , 1  
i
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and  the  second  level  allowing  for  CES  substitution  between  sources  of  energy.  We 
differentiate between the capital used for creating green energy and respectively traditional 
energy, each having different costs and being non-substitutable in the production process. 
This  allows  for  studying  investor  orientation  as  well  as  the  assignment  of  investment 
resources per capital category. Ultimately, at equilibrium we evaluate the throughput in 
terms of energy in general, energy per category, unit price, capital stock and breakdown and 
consumption patterns.  
Through econometric analysis we determine relevant parameters for our functions. Given 
the extensive size of the model (more than 30 equations, more than 30 variables), we forego 
presenting it in extenso. We used GEMPACK as supporting software, as it is one of the 
leading solutions for CGE problems. For some of the analysis we manually calculated the 
Jacobians associated with the Johansen/Euler iteration, allowing for insight into differential 
dynamics in an analytical form. 
 
2. CASE STUDIES 
 
In this section we will employ the model we developed in analysing separate markets, in 
order  to  outline  their  behaviour  under  different  circumstances.  Each  of  the  markets  is 
characterised  by  peculiarities  in  terms  of  consumption  culture  and  implicitly  consumer 
behaviour, therefore the dynamics are heterogeneous between the studied environments. 
Our analysis also covers specific aspects dealing with direct government implication and 
the degree of market liberalisation.  
 
2.1. Comparative statistics: Norwegian and Swedish green certificate markets  
 
The Norwegian and Swedish green certificate markets are arguably mature, with the latter 
being introduced in 2003 and the former in 2006. Moreover, they are co-integrated as part 
of a larger, Nordic market. This means that studying the impact of different policies is 
somewhat more interesting in their case, as the consumer base is likely to be well versed in 
the merits of green electricity, as well as the workings of the green certificate mechanism.  
Considering a single-period static model, we were interested in studying how much of the 
cost of producing green energy the consumers were willing to support explicitly. Also, by 
arbitrarily  introducing  pseudo-protectionist  measures,  like  discriminate  pricing  for  non-
local certificates or controlled government intervention aimed at affecting the equilibrium 
pricing we studied how  being part of a larger, trans-national market impacts dynamics. 
Another potentially interesting avenue of study is the one tied to the removal of green 
certificates, which we can simulate by adjusting the restrictions of the model. Finally, by 
altering the behaviour of the representative investors through modifying their payoffs per 
investment type, we studied what sort of incentives could be introduced in order to support 
the accumulation of capital aimed at producing green energy. 
The results offered by our model line-up with those presented in prior papers. First of all, 
given the current cost structure associated  with green energy production (which, in the 
absence of significant scientific breakthroughs isn‟t likely to fundamentally change in the 
near future), Norse consumers are ready to directly support up to 25% of it. Placing a 
higher burden on the consumer triggers a reduction in energy  consumption. Given that 
Norway appears to have a slight comparative advantage versus Sweden, the addition of 
protectionist measures impacted its producers more, with their product mix slightly shifting Economia. Seria Management                                  Volume 14, Issue 2, 2011 
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in favour of traditional and arguably  cheaper types  of energy,  which caused an overall 
reduction in production of energy from renewable sources – this was to be expected as 
production  was  above  the  compulsory  minimum  put  in  place  by  the  Norwegian 
government. 
Completely  removing the  green  certificate  mechanism had  an interesting  effect,  in  that 
overall the green energy throughput wasn‟t severely affected – this can be explained by 
capital already invested/involved in the production of green energy can‟t be repurposed. 
The investors, however, appeared to have a more intense reaction, with a notable reduction 
in  investments  directed  at  green  energy  production.  Based  on  this  behaviour,  we  then 
explored how governments in the two countries could more effectively stimulate investors 
do direct funds to green energy production. As such, we iteratively modified the form and 
parameters  of  the  investor  utility  functions.  The  results  we  achieved  suggest  that  a 
minimum  guaranteed  payoff  associated  with  investing  in  energy  based  on  renewable 
sources (for example, a lump sum handed by the government to those who chose to invest 
in green energy) is a very effective incentive strategy. 
 
2.2. Dynamic forecasting: Romanian green certificate market  
 
Moving  to  the  Romanian  case,  we  were  preoccupied  by  how  future  trajectories  are 
conditioned by current state. Unlike the other countries, Romania‟s green certificate system 
is only starting, with both consumers and producers being somewhat unfamiliar with such 
practices. We treated the model as a multi-period dynamic one, evaluating the number of 
iterations needed for convergence to equilibrium, as well as the state characterising that 
equilibrium. 
The fastest convergence was achieved when the amount of green energy taxation directly 
imposed on the consumer was kept at most equal to 10%. This is explained by the higher 
sensitivity of Romanian consumers by rapport with explicit taxation. Another interesting 
dynamic was attached to removing the significant subsidies currently offered to certain 
categories of consumers: there was a significant reduction in consumption at equilibrium, 
with prices following a downward sloping trend. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article we have treated the problem of using market mechanisms to handle green 
certificate distribution as a CGE one. We have thus constructed a model which allowed us 
to perform an extended analysis, which took into account both common aspects, like prices 
set at equilibrium and demand or supply associated with it, as well as more nuanced ones, 
for example the impact of governmental decisions or, more importantly, the way in which 
the peculiarities of consumers associated with a national space impacts behaviour when 
faced  with  similar  shocks.  We  believe  the  latter to  be  of  significance  for  planners  and 
entities interested in introducing a green certificate market into one country  or another, 
based on a foreign model and, by extensions, to international marketers. 
Our specific conclusions can be synthesized in the following list: 
1.  The way prices and governmental decisions come about in different European 
States has the potential to limit the development  the green certificates market; 
2.  Distortions  are  expected  in  situations  in  which  feed-in  regulations  or  a 
tendering system are combined with an international tradable green certificates system; Cristina GALALAE, Alexandru VOICU 
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3.  Most EU countries have some kind of policy  supporting renewable sourced 
electricity (RES-E) but Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs) are only implemented in a few 
states; 
4.  Different  sources  of  demand  for  green  certificates  (voluntary  demand  of 
customers for „green electricity‟ an obligation from the Government) generate different 
behaviours in different markets.  
We believe that our model, whilst comprehensive, is not all encompassing. In fact, its scale 
is  reduced  in  the  context  of  other  CGE  models.  Our  future  work  will  focus  both  on 
extending and refining it, moving to more complex functional forms, using a more granular 
segmentation of producers, consumers and investors, and studying more intricate, cascading 
effects of shocks like market liberalisation or the introduction of trans-national certificate 
trading. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This work was cofinanced from the European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational 
Programme  Human  Resources  Development  2007-2013,  project  number 
POSDRU/107/1.5/S/77213 „Ph.D. for a career in interdisciplinary economic research at the 
European standards”. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Dahlquist,  G.,  Bjork,  A.,  &  Anderson,  N.  (1974).  Numerical  Methods,  Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 
Dixon, P. B., & Parmenter, B. R. (1996). Computable General Equilibrium Modelling for 
Policy Analysis and Forecasting, Handbook of Computational Economics, 1, 4-85 
Dixon, P. B., Parmenter, B. R., Sutton, J., & Vincent, D. P. (1982). ORANI: A Multisectoral 
Model of the Australian Economy, North-Holland, Amsterdam 
European  Commission,  (1999).  Electricity  from  Renewable  Energy  Sources  and  the 
Internal  Electricity  Market,  Working  Paper,  Brussels,  Retrieved  from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/4923/ 
Haugneland, P. (2004). A Green Certificate Market May Result in Less Green Electricity, 
Retrieved from http://www. cicero.uio.no/fulltext/index_e.aspx?id=2722 
Jensen, S. G., & Skytte, K. (2002). Interaction Between the Power and Green Certificate 
Markets, Energy Policy, 30(5), 425-435 
Johansen,  L.  (1960).    A  Multisectoral  Study  of  Economic  Growth.  North-Holland, 
Amsterdam 
Marchenko, O. V. (2008). Modeling of a Green Certificate Market, Renewable Energy, 
33(8), 1953-1958 
Morthorst, P. E. (2003). A Green Certificate Market Combined with a Liberalized Power 
Market, Energy Policy, 32(13), 1393-1402 
Morthorst, P. E. (2000). The Development of a Green Certificate Market, Energy Policy, 
28(15), 1085-1094 
Schaeffer, G. J., Boots, M. G., Anderson, T., Mitchell, C., Timpe, C., & Cames, M. (1999). 
The Implications of Tradable Green Certificates for the Deployment of Renewable 
Electricity, Retrieved from http://www.ecn.nl/ docs/library/report/1999/c99072.pdf 
Soderholm,  P.  (2008).  The  Political  Economy  of  International  Green  Certificate  Markets, 
Energy Policy, 36(6), 2051-2062 